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More than twenty years ago, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) promised disabled children they would receive a "free appropriate
public education" in regular classrooms with non-disabled children whenever
possible-a minimally adequate education and access to an integrated school
setting.' The Supreme Court undermined the first half of that promise in 1982,
interpreting an "appropriate" or minimally adequate education primarily as one
that is reasonably calculated to confer "some educational benefit."2 It is a
standard even the poorest classroom arguably meets.
Since the Court opened the door for states and school districts to renege on
IDEA's promise, parents of disabled children have often been forced to accept
an inadequate education program or seek segregated, higher quality place-
ments.3 Neither alternative gives disabled children what they were promised:
a quality education and a chance to learn in classrooms alongside their non-
disabled peers.
This Note argues that parents of disabled children have another avenue of
recourse that would improve educational opportunities for their children and
non-disabled children alike: a new claim based on a new interpretation of
IDEA. Consistent with the Court's past interpretation of "appropriate" but
incorporating recent state and federal law, this new interpretation of IDEA
dictates that a minimally adequate education program is one that reflects state-
defined academic standards. Because IDEA also promises disabled children a
minimally adequate education in the "least restrictive environment," a
standards-based education must be provided to disabled children in the regular
classroom. If disabled children are receiving a substandard education because
t J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, 1998; B.A., Boston University, 1991. This Note has benefited
substantially from the feedback and advice of Michael Abramowicz, Adriana Duffy, and Professor John
Simon of Yale Law School. The author is especially indebted to Linda Epstein, without whose
comments and editorial assistance this Note would not have been possible.
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (Supp. 1996). IDEA was formerly known as the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act, and is still often cited as Pub. L. No. 94-142 (1975).
2. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982).
3. See Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Special Education Inclusion and the Courts: A
Proposal for a New Remedial Approach, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 523, 526 (1996)
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of the general inadequacy of the regular classroom, then the entire classroom
must be improved for all children. To do otherwise would require the
segregation of disabled children either outside or within the regular classroom,
which would violate IDEA's promise of adequacy and access.
This Note follows the above line of reasoning in four parts. Part I briefly
summarizes the background of IDEA, the statutory definition of the "free
appropriate public education" requirement, and the Court's past interpretation
of that requirement. Part II argues that a new interpretation of "free appropri-
ate public education" is in order. Section II.A examines the new standards-
based policy paradigm in education which suggests that a minimally adequate
education is an education that reflects state academic standards. Section II.B
discusses how state supreme courts have defined a minimally adequate
education as a standards-based education under their state constitution right-to-
education provisions. This Section asserts that state supreme court substantive
definitions of a minimally adequate education are incorporated into IDERs
"free appropriate public education" mandate. Therefore, a standards-based
education must be provided to disabled children in those states pursuant to
IDEA as well as state constitution guarantees. Section II.C discusses a new
federal law, the Improving America's Schools Act, which also embraces the
standards-based policy paradigm. This section asserts that state-created
standards adopted pursuant to the Improving America's Schools Act are
likewise incorporated into IDERs "free appropriate public education" mandate
and similarly must be provided pursuant to IDEA. Part III examines the second
half of IDEA's promise: access to an education in the "least restrictive environ-
ment." It briefly discusses the two primary circuit court decisions that interpret
the circumstances under which a district may segregate a disabled child. Part
III concludes that under both circuit tests, a disabled child may be removed
from the regular classroom only because of the specific "nature or severity of
their disability," and not because of the general inadequacy of the regular
classroom for all children. Lastly, Part IV discusses the implications of a
possible claim to a standards-based education in the regular classroom and
suggests a conservative, hands-off judicial remedy that respects the traditional
role of state and local officials in determining education policy.
I. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA)
A. Guaranteeing Adequacy, Access, and Acrimony in the Education
Programming of Disabled Children
In 1975, nearly half of all disabled children in America were either (a)
placed without any supplemental assistance in regular classrooms wholly
unprepared to meet their unique educational needs, or (b) excluded from public
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education entirely.4 Following judicial and state legislative action,5 Congress
responded to these glaring deficiencies of adequacy and access by crafting and
enacting IDEA. The Act has operated in much the same fashion for the last
twenty years.6 The federal government dispenses IDEA funds to states on the
condition that they provide an appropriate educational program, presumptively
in the regular classroom, to disabled children.7 To assure that the procedural
and substantive rights of disabled children are guaranteed, IDEA also requires
that an "individualized education plan" (IEP) be created for each disabled
child.' The IEP, developed jointly by school personnel and a child's parents,
describes a disabled child's short- and long-term education goals, as well as the
support services and instruction a school district will provide that are
reasonably calculated to help a child meet those goals.9
Since IDEA's enactment, there has been an extraordinary amount of
litigation regarding disabled student placement and IEP content and perfor-
mance. 10 Arguably as a result of that litigation, a sizable percentage of
increased education funding in the last twenty years has been devoted to special
education students. I Today disabled children constitute approximately twelve
percent of the total public school population, 2 but receive nearly twenty-five
percent of all education dollars."
4. See H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 4 (1975). In 1975, approximately four million disabled children
.were either totally excluded from schools or were sitting idly in regular classrooms awaiting the time
when they were old enough to drop-out." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 179.
5. See S. REP. No. 94-168, at20-21 (1975). IDEA's legislative history notes that Congress's intent
in passing the Act was to support state and local efforts to comply with various state and federal equal
protection and due process guarantees. Congress focused on a federal court-approved consent decree in
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971),
modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) [hereinafter PARC] (establishing Commonwealth's
obligation to provide all mentally retarded children with free appropriate education, preferably in the
regular classroom, and ensuring administrative hearing option regarding contested program or
placement) and a federal district court holding in Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866
(D.D.C. 1973) (extending PARC principles to children with other mental disorders). See also Rowley,
458 U.S. at 180. At the time of enactment, more than 30 states had their own laws protecting the
education rights of the disabled. See 121 CoNG. REc. 19,487-91 (June 18, 1975).
6. See Stephanie L. Gill, Punitive Damages: Flying in the Face of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 100 DICK. L. REv. 383, 389 (1996).
7. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1994); Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1219-20 (3d Cir.
1993); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1989).
8. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (1994).
9. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(19) to (a)(20) (1994).
10. A LEXIS search revealed nearly 1000 cases brought under IDEA since its original enactment.
It is estimated that three-fourths of these cases are pursued in federal court. See Perry A. Zirkel &
Sharon N. Richardson, The 'Explosion' in Education Litigation, 53 EDUC. L. REP. 767, 778-84 (1989).
See generally Rebell & Hughes, supra note 3.
11. See Allan Odden et al., The Story of the Education Dollar: No Academy Awards and No Fiscal
Smoking Guns, 77 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 161, 162 (Oct. 1995).
12. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 65
(1993).
13. See Odden, supra note 11, at 165-66.
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The increase in special education funding and attention has been the source
of much debate. 4 Parents of disabled children have tended to seek through
litigation separate, restrictive, high-quality education placements where their
children are more likely to experience smaller classes and receive more
individualized attention. 5 As a result, districts are devoting a growing share
of finite resources to disabled children to the exclusion of non-disabled chil-
dren.'6 Naturally, tension among advocates of targeted education funding has
arisen.' Those who argue for aid targeted on low-income youth resent
disabled children's "special" right-to-education claim and its ancillary
effects.' Low-income children do not have a similar right-to-education
claim,' 9 even though their likelihood of achieving academic success and
contributing productively to the national economy may be greater than that of
the disabled.' Regardless of one's position on the resource allocation debate,
the fact remains disabled children are entitled to a "free appropriate public
education" under IDEA whereas non-disabled children are not.
B. An Analysis of Henrick Hudson School District v. Rowley: Current
Doctrine Interpreting IDEA's "Free Appropriate Education" Guarantee
This Section examines IDE~s "free appropriate public education"
requirement and the definitive United States Supreme Court case interpreting
that requirement. The importance of the statute's express definition and
specifically elements "(C)" and "(B)" of that definition is noted. These two
elements in particular mandate that state-defined academic standards adopted
pursuant to state supreme court dictates and pursuant to the Improving
America's Schools Act discussed in Part II be incorporated into the definition
of "free appropriate public education."
14. See Sam Dillon, Special Education Absorbs School Resources, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1994, at
Al.
15. See Rebell & Hughes, supra note 3, at 526.
16. See Dillon, supra note 14, at Al.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., JOEL HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY,
BuREAucRAcY218-21 (1986); Bruce Meredith &Julie Underwood, IrreconcilableDifferences?Defining
the Rising Conflict between Regular and Special Educators, 24 J.L. & EDUC. 195, 208-09 (1995).
19. But cf. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding education not
fundamental right but in dicta noting that low-income children may have right to some undefined,
absolute minimum level of education).
20. See Meredith & Underwood, supra note 18, at 213. But see infra Section II.A.
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The statute expressly provides:
The term "free appropriate public education" means special education2' and
related services' that (A) have been provided at public expense .... (B) meet the
standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate... education
in the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized
education program . . . .
The seminal Court case interpreting IDEA, Board of Education v.
Rowley, 24 turned on the statute's definition of a "free appropriate public
education." Amy Rowley, a gifted deaf child, was not achieving her full
academic potential due to limited exposure to oral communication in her
regular classroom. Rowley's parents requested that the Henrick Hudson School
District provide a supplemental sign language interpreter in all of her regular
classes. The district objected, noting that its provision of an amplified hearing
aid, supplemental tutor, and speech therapist had contributed to Rowley's
successful grade level, though not above grade level or maximum, educational
achievement. In a ruling later affirmed by the Second Circuit, the District
Court held that Rowley was entitled under IDEA's "free appropriate public
education" mandate to "an opportunity to achieve [her] full potential
commensurate with the opportunity provided to other [non-disabled] chil-
dren."I The Supreme Court reversed.26
The Court criticized the District Court for ignoring IDEA's admittedly
cryptic, but nevertheless functional, definition of a "free appropriate public
education"27 and inserting in its place "an entirely unworkable standard" of
equal educational opportunities for disabled students "requiring impossible
measurements and comparisons. "a The Court wrote: "Furnishing handi-
capped children with only such services as are available to non-handicapped
children would in all probability fall short of the statutory requirement of 'free
appropriate public education,"29 while "furnishing of every special service
21. "Special education" is defined as "specially designed instruction... to meet the unique needs
of a [disabled] child." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (1994).
22. "Related services" is defined as "transportation and such developmental, corrective, and other
supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology... , physical and occupational therapy
... ,and medical services... for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist
a [disabled] child to benefit from special education." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1994).
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1994).
24. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982)
25. See Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aft'd, 632 F.2d 945,
947 (2d Cir. 1980).
26. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 176.
27. Id. at 186, 188.
28. Id. at 198.
29. Id. at 198-99
Yale Law & Policy Review
necessary to maximize each handicapped child's potential ... [would go]
further than Congress intended. "30
The Rowley Court found no congressional intent to impose a substantive
federal education standard upon the states.31 It said the Act's intent was
chiefly to ensure disabled children equal access to public education on
appropriate terms.32 The Court highlighted the role of the PARC and Mills
cases33 in particular as providing the main impetus for the legislation34 and
stated: "Both held that handicapped children must be given access to a publicly
supported adequate education. " "
Having dismissed the District Court's "commensurate opportunity" reading,
the Court put forth its own interpretation. Fusing together elements from the
statute's express definitions of "free appropriate public education,"36 "related
services,"37 and "special education," 38 the Court held that instruction must
be reasonably calculated to confer some educational benefit and conform with
IDEA's definitional checklist in order to constitute a "free appropriate public
education." According to the Court, instruction that satisfies IDEA's
definitional checklist must "[A] be provided at public expense, [B] meet the
State's educational standards, [C] approximate the grade levels used in the
State's regular education program, and [D] comport with the child's IEP. "39
The Court acknowledged the potential difficulty in determining whether a
disabled child was in fact receiving sufficient benefit under its "some
educational benefit" standard, but suggested regular grading and advancement
systems would offer satisfactory guidance to courts.'
The Court's four-part checklist includes a notable departure from the
statutory language. The statute defines a "free appropriate public education"
as including "(C) an appropriate ... education in the State involved."41
Perhaps because of the tautology inherent in that definition, the Court
translated the provision to require instruction that "[C] approximate[s] the
grade levels used in the State's regular education program." It is a variance
30. Id. at 199.
31. Id. at 192.
32. Id. at 203.
33. See Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa.
1971), modified, 343 F.Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Mills v. Board of Educ. 348 F. Supp. (D.D.C.
1973).
34. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982).
35. Id. at 193.
36. See supra text accompanying note 23.
37. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
38. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
39. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203 (emphasis added). This checklist refers to the items listed supra text
accompanying note 23. There are slight but important deviations in language.
40. Id. at 202. In the case of Amy Rowley, she was advancing at grade-level pace and therefore
determined to be receiving at least "some educational benefit" as entitled under IDEA.
41. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1994).
15:629, 1997
A Derivative Right to Education
with some import, because grade level advancement is a local decision based
on local norms whereas an appropriate education as defined by a state body
might be quite different.42 In fact, a number of state bodies have formed their
own definitions of a minimally appropriate education pursuant to both state
constitutional entitlements and the standards-based school reform movement.43
"It seems highly unlikely that Congress intended to overturn a State's
choice of appropriate educational theories," wrote the Court in Rowley.'
Indeed, reluctance to interfere in state education policy is precisely why
checklist element "(C)" incorporates state definitions of a minimally appropri-
ate education into the IDE/s "free appropriate public education" definition
and guarantee. To do otherwise would have the federal government either
supersede a state's definition of an appropriate education or require differential
and lesser treatment of disabled children. Neither outcome is consistent with
the letter or intent of IDEA.
II. NEW ACADEMIC STANDARDS-BASED INTERPRETATION OF "FREE
APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION" REQUIREMENT
The emergence of academic standards that identify what children should
know and be able to do has shifted the focus of education policy from inputs
to outcomes. Education is no longer defined in terms of years spent in school,
but instead in terms of knowledge and skills attained.45
Section II.A examines the new standards-based policy paradigm in
education - what circumstances gave rise to it, the theory behind it, and what
its effects are. Section II.B discusses the actions of state supreme courts in
defining a minimally adequate education as a standards-based education and
asserts that these definitions are incorporated into IDE/s "free appropriate
public education" mandate. Section III.C discusses a new federal law, the
Improving America's Schools Act, which also embraces the standards-based
policy paradigm, and asserts that standards adopted pursuant to it are also
incorporated into IDEA.
42. For example, although the vast majority of children successfully advance grade levels each year
in Newark, New Jersey, the State Board of Education has identified Newark as a failing school district.
See Karen Diegmueller, NJ Moves Toward Takeover of Newark Schools, EDUC. WK., Aug. 3, 1994,
at 23.
43. See infra Part II.
44. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-08. "It is clear that Congress was aware of the States' traditional role
in the formulation and execution of educational policy. 'Historically, the States have had the primary
responsibility for the education of children at the elementary and secondary level.'" Id. at 208 n.30
(quoting 121 CONG. REC. 19,498 (1975) (statement of Sen. Dole)).
45. See Chester E. Finn & Theodor Rebarber, The Changing Politics of Education Reform, in
EDUCATION REFORM IN THE '90S, at 175, 179 (Chester E. Finn, Jr., & Theodor Rebarber eds., 1992).
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A. The Standards-Based Policy Paradigm
National concern over stagnant student achievement and disappointing
international comparisons crystallized in the early 1980s following the release
of the now famous report, A Nation at Risk.46 The report warned ominously
of "a rising tide of mediocrity" in American education "threatening our future
as a nation and people."' Several states, including Arkansas, South Carolina,
and Tennessee, responded with a variety of isolated reforms including tougher
graduation requirements, high-stakes testing of both teachers and students, and
longer school years.48
A larger, more systemic school reform effort emerged, however, following
the 1989 National Education Summit. While two of the National Education
Goals adopted at the Summit spoke to internationally competitive student
competency in challenging subject matter,49 historic aversion to centralized
control of education generally and a national curriculum specifically left the
nation without agreement as to what children should know and be able to do
in different academic areas.5" In response, the Bush Administration began
awarding grants to different professional associations to develop model,
voluntary national academic standards. 51 At the same time, several states
began to develop their own standards and align teacher training, assessment,
textbooks, and curriculum to foster coordinated, comprehensive school
reform. 52
The theory behind standards-based school reform is that students will work
harder and achieve more when challenged with rigorous content and heightened
46. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, A NATION AT RISK: THE
IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983).
47. "We have ... been committing an act of unthinking, unilateral educational disarmament." Id.
at 5.
48. See Marshall S. Smith et al., The Improving America's Schools Act: A New Partnership, in
NATIONAL ISSUES IN EDUCATION: ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 6 (John F. Jennings
ed., 1995) [hereinafter NATIONAL ISSUES: ESEA].
49. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 5812(3)(A) & (5)(A) (Supp. 1996). Goal 3(A) states, "by the year 2000,
American students will leave grades 4, 8, and 12 having demonstrated competency over challenging
subject matter including English, mathematics, science ... history, and geography . . . ." Goal 5(A)
states, "by the year 2000, United States students will be first in the world in mathematics and science
achievement."
50. See Smith, supra note 48, at 6.
51. Professional bodies thathave developed model, voluntary academic standards include the Center
for Civic'Education and the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics. See CENTER FOR CIVIC
EDUCATION, NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR CIVICS AND GOVERNMENT (1994); NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
TEACHERS OF MATHEMATICS, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS FOR TEACHING MATHEMATICS (1991).
52. See Jennings, supra note 48, at viii. Systemic reform efforts were also propelled by a series
of state constitutional right-to-education cases in the late 1980's and early 1990's as well. See Alexandra
Natapoff, 1993: The Year ofLivingDangerously: State Courts Expand the Right to Education, 92 EDUC.
L. REP. 755 (1994). The first and most significant of these cases comes from Kentucky. See Rose v.
Council for Better Educ. Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
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expectations." An agreed-upon set of outcomes allows for more flexibility in
education programming and administration.54 Teachers and principals are
freed to find the best means to higher student achievement.5' Policymakers no
longer direct how educational services are delivered, but instead focus on what
is achieved. 6 In short, there is a shift in policy emphasis from accounting to
accountability. Reagan Administration Assistant Education Secretary Chester
Finn describes the change in terms of a new conceptual paradigm:
Under the old conception ... education was thought of as process and system,
effort and intention, investment and hope .... Under the new definition.. .only
if the process succeeds and learning occurs do we say that education has in fact
happened. Absent evidence of such a result, there is no education.'
Perhaps the more striking aspect of standards-based reform theory is that
academic standards should not only be high, but that they should also be the
same for all children.5" Advances in cognitive science and educational
research show that all children, even those with a history of the lowest
academic achievement, are capable of learning to the same high standards as
their "honors" track peers.59 Research indicates that low academic achieve-
ment associated with disabled children often exists independent of intellectual
ability and can be reversed with proper training." Indeed, the very purpose
of the IEP is to ensure that disabled children receive the supplemental services
and tailored instruction that their individual disabilities require.6' The IEP
53. See generally DIANE RAVITCH, NATIONAL STANDARDS IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: A CITIZEN'S
GUIDE (1995).
54. See John F. Jennings, SchoolReform: The Making ofTwo New National Policies, in NATIONAL
ISSUES IN EDUCATION: GOALS 2000 AND SCHOOL-TO-WORK 185, 188 (John F. Jennings ed., 1995)
[hereinafter NATIONAL ISSUES: GOALS 2000] ("Integral to this standards-based systemwide reform...
is the idea that much greater flexibility can be given to teachers and administrators .... If students
really achieve a mastery of the subject matter, how they did it becomes secondary.").
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Chester E. Finn, The Biggest Reform of All, 71 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 584, 586 (1990).
58. See RAVITCH, supra note 53, at 26; Odden, supra note 11, at 167.
59. See JOHN BRUER, SCHOOLS FOR THOUGHT 77-79 (1992). Jaime Escalante's experience in East
Los Angeles, California, popularized in the movie Stand andDeliver, provides the best known example
of children with a history of low academic achievement successfully learning in response to challenging
standards. Escalante's students, formerly tracked in "remedial" classes and overwhelmingly from low-
income backgrounds, passed the College Board's rigorous AP Calculus examination in numbers that
rival the most elite prep schools in the nation. See JAY MATHEwS, ESCALANTE: THE BEST TEACHER
IN AMERICA 310-12 (1988). Their success came from a blend of high expectations, challenging material,
and well-tailored teaching methods. Id.
60. See Sally E. Shaywitz, Dyslexia, 275 Scl. AM., Nov. 1996, at 98, 102. Dyslexics, for example,
possess some of the most advanced higher order thinking skills (e.g., problem solving, concept
formation and comprehension, and reasoning skills) in children of their age because of their unconscious
use of "big picture" models and devices to learn and remember everyday specific details. Id. at 104.
61. See School Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985). An IEP might, for
example, note that a child is to be provided a hearing aid and receive "phonics"-based reading
instruction, instead of the "whole language"- based instruction his or her classmates receive. But if the
academic standard for all children at his or her grade level were to be well-versed in different literary
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serves as a "procedural safeguard" intended to guarantee the substantive rights
of disabled children to a "free appropriate education" under IDEA.62 It does
not give states a license to provide disabled children with an education that
reflects different, lesser standards.63
Regardless of whether one accepts the policy and cognitive science theories
behind the standards-based reform movement, its scope is not to be understat-
ed. Nearly every state has developed or adopted content and student perfor-
mance standards.' Textbook and test publishers are beginning to link their
products to standards developed by professional bodies.' Schools of education
are beginning to train future teachers in standards-based subject matter as well
as effective pedagogy.' Lastly, parents, many of whom lack concrete data on
their children's education programs,67 are using standards to better assess the
quality of their neighborhood schools.6"
forms, such as plays, novels, poetry, and essays, and to be able to critique written material and write
persuasive arguments, the disabled student would still be taught to, and expected to, master that subject
matter and those skills.
62. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982) ("[A]dequate compliance with the
procedures prescribed [in the IEP] would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished
in the way of substantive content.") Others have also suggested that the intent of the IEP is to make
parents equal partners in the education program decisionmaking process. See, e.g., Tara J. Parrillo, The
Individuals with Disabilities EducationAct (iDEA): Parental Involvement andthe SurrogateAppointment
Process, 74 OR. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1995).
63. See 20 U.S.C. § 6317(c)(1), (d)(3) & infra Section II.C. Legislation to reauthorize IDEA,
passed by the key House and Senate Education Committees in 1996 further indicates that disabled
children are to be taught to the same standards and general curriculum as their non-disabled peers. The
IEP is to include "a statement of the special education and... supplementary aids and services to be
provided [to enable] the child ... to be involved and progress in the general curriculum.... ." H.R.
3268, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 602(11)(E) (1996) (emphasis added). Children with severe mental
disabilities, such as those associated with Down's Syndrome or mental retardation, naturally cannot be
expected to learn the same material as their non-disabled peers regardless of supplemental services and
specialized instruction. These children comprise approximately 1.2% of that national public school age
population, and constitute less than 12% of all identified disabled children. See DIGEST OF EDUCATION
STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 54, 65. The place of these children in standards-based reform remains an
unsettled question. See Allan Odden, Productive Discussions About the Education Dollar, EDUC. WK.,
Feb. 7, 1996, at 26. ("The goal of current education reform is to teach all but the severely disabled to
high academic standards... ."). Because of this ambiguity, the strongest minimum education legal claim
linked to IDEA would not be based on their presence.
64. See John F. Jennings, Introduction, in NATIONAL ISSUEs: ESEA, supra note 48, xxi. New York
City Schools Chancellor Rudy Crew additionally has recently proposed New York City overhaul its
curriculum, professional development program, and assessment system to be consistent with academic
standards developed by the Washington-based New Standards Project. See Pam Belluck, Crew Wants
National Standards to be Used in New York Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1996, at Al.
65. C. RAVITCH, supra note 53, at 26 (noting that products of test publishers and schools of
education are often driven by curricula in big states, such as California, which has adopted content
standards).
66. Id.
67. More than 60% of public school parents believe their neighborhood school is providing a
quality education, while incongruently approximately 60% of public school parents also believe the
nation's public schools are failing to provide a quality education. See Stanley M. Elam & Lowell C.
Rose, The 27th Annual PhiDelta Kappa/Gallup Poll of the Public's Attitude toward Public Schools, 77
PHI DELTA KAPPAN 41, 42-43 (Sept. 1995).
68. School performance measures linked to the numbers and percentages of children successfully
meeting academic standards provide parents with a concrete benchmark against which they can assess
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Although the standards movement is still in its early stages,69 the
preliminary results are encouraging. In Kentucky, one of the first and most
aggressive states to undertake standards-based reform, there has been
substantial improvement in fourth, eighth, and twelfth graders' test scores,10
with the most dramatic improvement occurring in the earliest grades.7" A
focus on outcomes has led to a twenty-eight percent cut in state bureaucracy,72
and a high school graduation rate that is the highest in state history.73 In
Maryland, now six years into sustained standards-based school reform, forty
percent of all students performed at proficient or advanced levels on the state's
content standard mastery test in 1995,' 4 an increase of some twenty-five
percent over 1993.15 The number of elementary schools meeting the state's
academic goals for third grade student performance increased by fifty-two
percent.76 Similarly, gains at the fifth and eighth grade levels were thirteen and
thirty-two percent respectively.' And in California, which pioneered
standards-based reform in the mid-1980s, the proportion of high school
graduates meeting minimum entrance requirements to the state university
system has increased by one-third. The state's dropout rate is down and the
number of Advanced Placement examinations taken and passed has tripled.78
Although achievement nationally continues to lag, standards-based school
the quality of their neighborhood school and compare it to other area local schools. See Joseph Berger,
School Ratings Raise Hackles in the Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1997, at 1.
69. It will take years for all the components of standards-based reform to be implemented before
results can be fully assessed. Teachers must be trained to teach to newly adopted standards. Assessments
that measure student performance against adopted standards must be developed and field-tested to assure
their validity and reliability. Parents, students, and business leaders must be educated as to new
expectations. It will be in total a slow, difficult process, replete with fits and starts. See FINN &
REBARBER, supra note 45, at 189.
70. See Kentucky Dep't of Educ., "Student Acadenic Achievement Continues to Rise," Frankfort,
KY: Press Release, Jan. 30, 1996; see also Lynn Olson, 'Dramatic' Rise in KY Test Scores Linked to
School Reform, EDUC. WK., Oct. 5, 1994, at 13; Alice H. Davis, Education Reform: Are Kentucky
Schools Getting Better?, CINc NNATI ENQUIRER, June 4, 1995, at A3. In 1992, the first year Kentucky
administered its new standards-based statewide assessment system, more than three-quarters of students
in 4th, 8th, and 12th grades failed to demonstrate proficiency in every subject tested. By 1994, the
failure rate dropped by some 85% and the percentage of eighth graders demonstrating advanced
achievement increased from 8% to 18% in reading and from 13% to 19% in mathematics. Among
twelfth graders, the percentage of advanced achievers grew from 10% to 16% in reading and 10% to
19% in mathematics. See RAVITCH, supra note 53, at 167-68.
71. In reading, for example, the percentage of 4th graders performing at proficient or advanced
levels increased from 8% to 30% between 1994 and 1995. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., GOALS 2000:
A PROGRESS REPORT 3 (Fall 1996).
72. See Davis, supra note 70, at A3.
73. See RAVITCH, supra note 53, at 167.




78. See RAVITCH, supra note 53, at 132; Bill Honig, How Can Horace Best Be Helped?
Educational Reform in California, 75 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 790 (June 1994).
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reform where implemented has contributed to measurable educational
improvement. 9
B. Standards Identified Pursuant to State Supreme Court Decisions to Be
Incorporated Into IDEA's "Free Appropriate Public Education"
Definition
Civil rights attorneys have recently argued that the standards-based policy
paradigm translates the right to education guaranteed in nearly all state
constitutions into a substantive requirement that can be measured.8" Their
groundbreaking successful challenge is found in Kentucky's Rose v. Council
for Better Education case.8 ' The Kentucky Supreme Court offered the first
comprehensive substantive definition of a state constitution's right-to-education
clause and held that every child in the Commonwealth is entitled to a
minimally "adequate education."' The Kentucky Supreme Court found:
[A]n efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide each and every
child with at least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient oral and written
communication skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly
changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political
systems to enable the student to make informed choices, (iii) sufficient understand-
ing of governmental processes to enable the student to understand the issues that
affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and
knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in
the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical
heritage; (vi) sufficient training in either academic or vocational fields so as to
enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient
levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school students to compete
with their counterparts in surrounding states.8
The state legislature went on to successfully meet the court's mandate by
enacting school reform legislation identifying academic and student perfor-
mance standards and providing children throughout the state a fair chance at
meeting those standards."
After the Rose case, a number of state supreme courts followed Kentucky's
lead in also reading into their state constitution education provisions a
79. See Richard W. Riley, The Improving America's Schools Act and Elementary and Secondary
Education Reform, 24 J.L. & EDUC. 513, 550 (1995) ("[W]e have turned the comer in education.").
80. See Martha I. Morgan et al., Establishing Education Program Inadequacy: The Alabama
Example, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 559 (1991); George Judson, Civil Rights Lawyers Hope to Use
Hartford Schools Case as a Model, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1996, at B1. At least 49 states have such a
clause. See Note, The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1324, 1447 n.94
(1982).
81. See Rose v. Council for Better Edue., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 212.
84. See Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990, ch. 476, 1990 Ky AcTs §§ 1208-1810.
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guarantee of a minimally adequate education.' The constitutional provisions
vary in language: assuring "an efficient system of common schools,"86 a
"liberal system of public schools,"87 and a "duty to cherish the interests of
literature and science."88 But each of these state supreme courts cites Rose's
seven-part guideline substantively defining a minimal right to education with
approval.89 State legislatures similarly have enacted school reform legislation
identifying academic and student performance standards and assuring children
throughout their states a fair chance at meeting those standards.'
The United States Courts of Appeals have repeatedly held that IDEAs
"free appropriate public education" definition includes substantive state
standards that enhance the Rowley Court's minimal "some educational benefit"
requirement.9" Indeed, the Rowley decision directs such a result in holding
that a "free appropriate public education" is an education that confers some
educational benefit and meets other items on the statute's definitional
checklist. 2 Thus, in states like Kentucky, Alabama, and Massachusetts, where
state supreme courts have identified a substantive definition of a minimally
adequate education, their definitions are incorporated into IDEA's "free
appropriate public education" definition through checklist element "(C)". 93
85. See, e.g., McDuffy v. Secretary of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 548 (Mass. 1993); Opinion of the
Justices, 624 So.2d 107, 110 (Ala. 1993) (agreeing in advisory opinion with result in Alabama Coalition
for Equity v. Hunt, 624 So.2d 110 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 1993)); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter,
851 S.W.2d 139, 150 (Tenn. 1993).
86. See KY. CONST., art. XII, § 183.
87. See ALA. CONSr., art. XIV, §256.
88. See MASS. CONST., pt. 2, c. 5, §2.
89. See Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Folsom, No. CV-90-883-R (Remedy Order) (Oct. 22,
1993); McDuffi, 615 N.E.2d at 554; McWhether, 851 S.W.2d at 150.
90. See Jennifer O'Day, Goals 2000, in NATIONAL ISSUES: GOALS 2000, supra note 54, at 99, 105-
08.
91. See, e.g., Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir. 1994) ("State standards that
impose a greater duty to educate handicapped children, if they are not inconsistent with federal
standards, are enforceable in federal court under IDEA."); Burlington v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ.,
736 F.2d 773, 789 n.19 (1st Cir. 1984), aftid, 471 U.S. 359 (1985) (holding state standards enhancing
minimal federal substantive "free appropriate public education" definition enforceable under IDEA
through required incorporation). State standards may not be applied in a manner that would diminish
IDEA's "least restrictive environment" requirement. Id.
92. See supra Section I.B. Although IDEA's definitional checklist states that a "free appropriate
public education" means an "(C) appropriate ... education in the State involved" and not a minimally
adequate education in the State involved, the legislative language, history, and Rowley Court use both
words interchangeably so often it is clear the terms are intended to mean the same thing. The Act, for
example, requires states to extend education services first to disabled children entirely excluded from
public education, and then to disabled children receiving an "inadequate education." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(3) (1994) (emphasis added). Leading legislators stated during IDEA's consideration that "all too
often, our handicapped citizens have been denied the opportunity to receive an adequate education." See
Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 191 n.13 (1981) (quoting 121 CONG. REC. 19494 (1975)
(statement of Sen. Javits). And the Rowley Court repeatedly refers to the statute inspiring PARC and
Mills holdings as requiring an "adequate education." SeeRowley, 458 U.S. at 186, 189, 193 n.15, and
197 n.21.
93. State-initiated standards-based reform efforts often proceed in fits and starts. See Finn &
Rebarber, supra note 45, at 189. Commentators have noted the important role the federal courts can
play in emboldening the resolve of state political actors. See An Examination of the Federal Role in
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C. Standards Identified Pursuant to the Improving America's Schools Act of
1994 to Be Incorporated Into IDEA's "Free Appropriate Public
Education" Definition
Fully aware of state standard-based school reform efforts, federal
policymakers in early 1993 embarked on the periodic reassessment and
reauthorization of nearly all federal elementary and secondary education
programs.94 During the 1970s and 1980s, these programs helped dramatically
reduce the achievement gap between disadvantaged students and their more
advantaged peers.95 By 1993, however, major research findings concluded
that progress had stalled and in many cases federal programs operated directly
at odds with state reform efforts. 6
To respond to those findings and align federal law with state reforms,
Congress passed the Improving America's Schools Act of 1994. 9 The
landmark law comprehensively revamped the main federal elementary and
secondary programs to support state and local standards-based school reform
for all children. 98 Participating states are required to develop outcome-based
academic standards of what all children should know and be able to do at
various grade levels. 99 States are required to develop student performance
standards that indicate different proficiency levels of subject-matter mas-
tery." ° They are also required to define adequacy outcomes for schools and
districts in terms of the numbers and percentages of children meeting state
student performance standards.101 Districts and schools that continuously fail
to meet minimal adequacy outcomes must be slated for corrective action.l °2
To meet those outcomes, teachers and principals receive extraordinary freedom
in program design and implementation." 3 The statute's main requirement is
School Finance Before the Subcomm. on Educ., Arts & Humanities of the Sen. Comm. on Labor &
Human Resources, 103d Cong. 166 (1993) (statement of William L. Taylor, attorney) [hereinafter
Finance Hearings]; Kern Alexander, The Common School and the Limits of Legislative Authority: The
Kentucky Case, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 341, 344 (1989).
94. In fact, the first witness to testify before Congress regarding the reauthorization of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 was Dr. Thomas Boysen, Commissioner of Education
for the State of Kentucky. See Hearings on H.R. 6: The Role of ESEA Programs in School Reform
Before the Subcomm. on Elementary & Secondary Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 103d
Cong. 5 (1993).
95. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., REINVENTING CHAPTER 1: THE CURRENT CHAPTER 1 PROGRAM
AND NEW DIRECTIONS 13 (1993) [hereinafter NATIONAL ASSESSMENT].
96. See Smith, supra note 48, at 7.
97. Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (1994).
98. 20 U.S.C.A. § 6301(d) (Supp. 1996).
99. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1).
100. Id. Performance standards indicate whether a student's subject matter mastery is inadequate,
acceptable, or advanced.
101. 20 U.S.C.A. § 6311(b)(2).
102. 20 U.S.C.A. § 6317(c)(5), (d)(6).
103. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 6314, 8881.
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simply that state-defined academic and student performance standards be the
same for all children. 4
As with the state supreme court interpretations of minimum education
entitlements, standards developed pursuant to the Improving America's Schools
Act are also incorporated into IDEA's "free appropriate public education"
definition. If anything, the incorporation requirement is clearer in the case of
standards required by the Improving America's Schools Act than in the case
of state supreme court dictates: IDEA's definitional checklist provides that a
"free appropriate public education" means instruction that "(B) meets the
standards of the State educational agency." 05 The Rowley Court clarified any
ambiguity as to the type of standards the statute refers to when it held
instruction that meets IDEA's definitional checklist must also "[B] meet the
State's educational standards." 1"e
The legislative language of IDEA and the Improving America's Schools Act
alone make clear the intended connection between the two statutes.1°7 But
there is additional evidence from which to infer Congress's intent to fully
incorporate the disabled into the Improving America's Schools Act and to
recognize the legislation's relationship with IDEA. Repeatedly, the Improving
America's Schools Act refers to the applicability of standards to all chil-
dren."'5 The Act also requires that statewide assessment systems linked to
state-developed standards provide adaptations and accommodations necessary
for the full participation of students with diverse learning needs, including
children with disabilities. 9 In fact, the Chairman of the Senate Disability
Subcommittee offered a series of unanimously accepted amendments during
consideration of the Improving America's Schools Act to assure the full
integration of disabled children in standards-based school reform. 110 Finally,
pending legislation to reauthorize IDEA proposed by the Clinton Administra-
104. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 6311(b)(l)(C), 6312(e)(2).
105. See supra text accompanying note 23.
106. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203 (1982) (emphasis added).
107. The plain language of a statute primarily controls its interpretation. See INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,430-432,432 n.12 (1987); INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984). This
strong presumption is to be questioned only when "clearly expressed" legislative history indicates an
intent contrary to the legislative language. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 432 n.12. Nothing in the
legislative language or history of the Improving America's Schools Act indicates congressional intent
that academic standards developed pursuant to the Act not be applied to disabled children through IDEA.
Similarly, nothing in the legislative language or history of IDEA indicates congressional intent that rights
conferred upon disabled children produce no derivative benefit for non-disabled children.
108. See supra note 97. In fact, the Goals 2000: Educate America Act, passed six months prior to
the Improving America's Schools Act, and which the Improving America's Schools Act's legislative
history refers to as providing its "framework," see S. REP. NO. 103-292, at2 (1994), expressly defines
"all children" to include "children with disabilities." 20 U.S.C.A. § 5802(a)(1) (Supp. 1996).
109. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3)(F).
110. Interview with David Evans, Staff Director, Senate Subcomm. on Educ., Arts and Humanities
(Mar. 15, 1996). Every member of the House and Senate subcommittees with jurisdiction over IDEA
was also a member of the education subcommittees responsible for the development of the Improving
America's Schools Act. See LEADERSHIP DIRECrORIEs, THE CONGRESSIONAL YELLOW BOOK 96 (1994).
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tion,"' unanimously approved by the Senate Labor Committee,112 and
passed by the House Education Committee by a vote of 32-511 confirms that
disabled children must be taught to the same standards and general curriculum
as non-disabled children. 1
14
III. GUARANTEEING ACCESS: RARE EXCEPTIONS To IDERs "LEAST
RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT" REQUIREMENT
For all of Rowley's significance, the case only posited a test to determine
whether a disabled child was receiving an appropriate education. Because Amy
Rowley was fully mainstreamed into a regular classroom and there was no
disagreement over her placement, the Court did not, nor has it since, addressed
the meaning of IDEs "least restrictive environment" requirement." 5 The
"least restrictive environment" requirement, which controls the settings in
which disabled children are to be educated, goes to the second part of IDEAs
promise-an assurance of access to public education on appropriate terms." 6
Two primary, sometimes conflicting, tests have emerged in the United
States Courts of Appeals interpreting the "least restrictive environment"
requirement. 1 7 Both attempt to provide practical guidance as to when a
disabled child may be removed from the regular classroom setting. Both
evidence a strong preference for mainstreaming, "1 aversion to the unilateral
segregation of disabled children outside or within the regular classroom," 9
and recognition that the circumstances under which disabled children may be
removed from the regular classroom must find their source in the "nature or
111. See Lynn Schnaiberg, Clinton Proposal Pushes Higher Standards for Special-Ed. Students,
EDUC. WK., July 12, 1995, at 1.
112. See S. REP. No. 104-275, Individuals with Disabilities ActAmendments of 1996, at 25 (1996).
113. See H.R. REP. 104-614, IDEA Improvement Act of 1996, at 50 (1996).
114. See S. 1578, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 612 (a)(16), 614 (e)(1)(B); H.R. 3268, 104th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 602(11)(E).
115. See Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1989); Roncker v.
Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir. 1983).
116. See infra text accompanying note 120; Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1047.
117. The Sixth's Circuits Roncker test, infra Section II.A, is followed by the Fourth, Sixth, and
Eighth Circuits. See Doe v. Board of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 460 (6th Cir. 1993) (denying parents public
reimbursement for private school placement costs of child with learning disabilities); Devries v. Fairfax
County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 878-79 (4th Cir. 1989); A.W. v. Northwest R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d
158, 163 (8th Cir. 1987) (allowing disabled child placement in segregated setting because of substantial
costs of duplicating services in regular classroom environment). The Daniel R.R. test or a version
thereof, infra Section HLI.B, is followed by the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits. See Sacramento City
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994); Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995
F.2d 1204, 1215 (3rd Cir. 1993); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048.
118. See Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983). The court also noted that
IDEA's mainstreaming requirement applies to non-academic activities such as lunch, gym, recess, and
transportation to and from school. Id. at 1063 n.6; see also Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1044; 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.553 (1997).
119. See infra Section III.B.
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severity of the child's disability" and not the general inadequacy of the regular
classroom.
IDEA mandates that each state establish:
procedures to assure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, children with
disabilities... are educated with children who are not disabled, and that special
classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the
regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the
disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary
aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.'20
A. The Sixth Circuit's Roncker Requirement for the Desegregation of
Disabled Children
The Sixth Circuit in Roncker v. Walter followed what could be termed a
maximum access entitlement construction of IDEA's "least restrictive
environment" mandate.' 2 ' Although mainstreaming is not required in every
circumstance, the Sixth Circuit held that IDEA's "least restrictive environ-
ment" mandate indicates a "very strong congressional preference" for
mainstreaming.' 22
In some cases, a placement which may be considered better for academic reasons
may not be appropriate because of the failure to provide for mainstreaming....
In a case where [a] segregated facility is considered superior, the court should
determine whether the services which make that placement superior could be
feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting. If they can, the placement in the
segregated [setting is] inappropriate under the Act."
The Sixth Circuit slightly moderated its "portable services test" by identifying
excessive cost and the potentially disruptive negative impact of a disabled
child's presence on the regular classroom as two factors that could mitigate
against mainstreamed placement. 24
120. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1994) (emphasis added).
121. Roncker objected to her severely disabled son's full-time placement in a separate special school
exclusively for disabled children. Roncker believed her son would benefit from contact with non-
disabled peers during at least some of the school day. See Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1061.
122. Id. at 1063.
123. Id.
124. Consideration of cost, the Sixth Circuit noted, is justified only insofar as "excessive spending
on one handicapped child deprives other handicapped children." Id. One may infer that under the
Ronckertest, therefore, cost is not an appropriate consideration injustifying segregated placement when
viewed as constraining a district's ability to provide a better education to non-disabled children.
Similarly, federal regulations provide for a disabled child's removal from the regular classroom due to
disruptiveness only insofar as such behavior limits a school district's ability to meet the needs of the
disabled child in question, not other non-disabled students' needs. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.552 Comment.
But see Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1989) ("If... the disabled
child requires so much of the teacher['s] ... time that the rest of the class suffers, the balance will tip
in favor of [segregated placement].").
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B. Limits on the Segregation of Disabled Children Under the Fifth
Circuit's Daniel R.R. Test and the Ninth Circuit's Rachel H. Test
The Fifth Circuit in Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education agreed with
the Sixth Circuit in Roncker that IDE's "least restrictive environment"
mandate indicates a "strong [congressional] preference" for mainstreaming, but
noted in addition the statute's aversion to the segregation of disabled students
within the regular classroom.1z While the Sixth Circuit's Roncker test
demonstrates fierce judicial antipathy to segregated placement, the Fifth Circuit
in Daniel R.R. noted that IDE~s "least restrictive environment" requirement
is not so rigid as to mandate mainstreaming even in cases where a child's
disability is so severe that a regular classroom teacher must devote nearly all
of his or her time exclusively to one disabled child.126 Indeed, the severe
nature of Daniel's disabilities led the Fifth Circuit to hold that a mainstreamed
placement was inappropriate in his case because in effect "the child would be
receiving special education instruction in the regular classroom." 127
The Daniel R.R. Fifth Circuit concluded that in nearly always requiring a
mainstreamed placement, the Roncker test was "too intrusive,""2 and instead
articulated its own test that balanced the benefits of regular and special
education for each disabled child. 2 9 The test, adopted and refined further by
the Ninth Circuit in Sacramento City School District v. Rachel H., weighs:
(1) the educational benefit of placements available to the child in a regular
classroom ... as compared to the educational benefits of a special education
classroom; (2) the non-academic benefits to the child of interaction with nonhandi-
capped children; (3) the effect of the presence of the child on the teacher and other
children in the regular classroom; and (4) the costs of supplementary aids and
services necessary to mainstream the handicapped child.'31
As in Roncker, the only factors that might mitigate against mainstreamed
placement find their source in the nature or severity of a child's disability, not
the general inadequacy of the regular classroom. The Daniel R.R. / Rachel H.
test is also consistent with Roncker in upholding the value of non-academic
benefits such as integration and positive peer behavior models. Because of the
value of those non-academic benefits, IDEAs mainstreaming presumption
125. See Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1044 (5th Cir. 1989). As in Roncker, Daniel R.R.'s parents
insisted that their severely disabled son be mainstreamed even if he could not excel academically in a
regular classroom environment. Id. at 1036-37.
126. Id. at 1049.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1046.
129. Id. at 1048.
130. Sacramento City Sch. Dist. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 878 (E.D. Cal. 1992), aftd, 14
F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
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cannot be rebutted merely by showing that a special education placement is
academically superior to the regular classroom.'3
C. Consensus Among the Courts of Appeal Regarding IDEA's "Least
Restrictive Environment" Requirement
The Courts of Appeals have consistently interpreted IDEas "least
restrictive environment" requirement to mandate that disabled children be
placed presumptively in the regular classroom.'32 They agree that main-
streaming is not required in every circumstance,' although there is a
conflict as to when the mainstreaming presumption can be rebutted. Each
circuit's limits on mainstreaming, however, find their source in the nature or
severity of a child's disability and not the general inadequacy of the regular
classroom for all children.'34 The circuits recognize that IDEA views all
disabled children as having unique needs that entitle them to personalized
consideration based on "individualized, fact specific inquiries. " '35 Each test
expresses in varying ways the Act's aversion to the unilateral segregation of
disabled children either outside or within the regular classroom. 3 6 They both
recognize the value of non-academic benefits available to a disabled child in an
integrated setting. And while the Supreme Court has not resolved the circuit
conflict, it has noted IDEA's legislative history indicates congressional intent
to assure disabled children equal access to public education. 13
Thus, in the growing number of states whose state supreme courts have
interpreted their own state constitutions to include substantive standards of an
education that all children must be provided, IDEA's "free appropriate public
education" definition is heightened consistent with those rulings. 31 In those
states and others whose supreme courts have not articulated a substantive
131. Id. at 878-879.
132. See Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1213, 1219-20 (3rd Cir. 1993); Daniel R.R.
v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1989); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063
(6th Cir. 1983). But see Briggs v. Board of Educ., 882 F.2d 688 (2nd Cir. 1989) (noting that district
"consideration" of Act's preference for mainstreaming sufficiently complies with "least restrictive
environment" requirement).
133. See supra Sections Il.A & B.
134. See supra Sections MI.A & B.
135. See Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[Olur analysis is an individualized, fact-
specific inquiry that requires us to examine carefully the nature and severity of the child's handicapping
condition, his needs and abilities, and the schools' response to the child's needs."); see also Holland,
786 F. Supp. 874, 878 (C.D. Cal. 1992) ("[The placement] decision... [is] an inquiry into the needs
and abilities of one child, and does not extend to a group or category of handicapped children.").
136. See supra Sections M.A & B.
137. See supra text accompanying note 32; see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323 (1988)
("Congress very much meant to strip schools of the unilateral authority.., to exclude disabled students
... from school.") (emphasis added).
138. See supra Section HI.B. Successful policy results from right-to-education claims based on state
constitutional provisions often regress over time. See supra note 93. Pressure from the federal judiciary
may embolden a state's legislature to protect gains.
Yale Law & Policy Review
definition of a minimally required education, the state-defined academic
standards and student performance standards required pursuant to the new
Improving America's Schools Act also heighten IDEA's "free appropriate
public education" definition.139 Finally, IDEs "least restrictive environ-
ment" requirement mandates that states not only provide disabled children an
education that reflects those state-defined academic standards, but also that they
do so in the regular classroom in a manner which does not facially segregate.
Hence, pursuant to IDEA, an education that reflects state-defined academic
standards must be provided in the regular classroom for all children when
disabled children are present so that they are not unilaterally singled out
independent of the nature or severity of their disability for separate and unequal
treatment.
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND REMEDY
Parts I, II, and III of this Note suggest that when the promise of adequacy
and access to children with disabilities is betrayed by the general failure of a
classroom for all children, legal recourse may be available. Two questions are
raised that have been virtually dispositive in education cases before the courts.
First, is the claim justiciable? Second, is there a politically viable remedy that
respects the traditional role of state and local officials in education policy? The
unique statute - IDEA - on which the claim might be based and thinking in
the education research and policy community derived from the standards
movement suggest the answer to both questions is affirmative.
A. Legal and Political Implications
IDEA provides an express right of private action to the parents of disabled
children who object to the quality or nature of their child's program or
placement. 4 ' Although the individualized education plan is the primary
instrument available to assure compliance with IDEA, it is not the only
one.14' Courts may entertain individual claims or certify class action suits
pursuant to IDEA violations when systemic failure renders individual actions
overly burdensome. 42 Claims are to be adjudicated based on a preponderance
of evidence and courts are expressly authorized to grant any "such relief as
[they] determine appropriate." 143
139. See supra Section ll.C.
140. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1994).
141. See Honig, 484 U.S. at 310 (1988).
142. See, e.g., Roncker v. Waiter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).
143. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1994); see also School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of
Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (noting court authority to grant appropriate relief pursuant
§ 1415(e)(2) confers "broad discretion" to courts in fashioning IDEA remedies).
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Neither IDEA nor the Improving America's Schools Act confers upon non-
disabled children an entitlement to a minimally adequate education. 144 Where
there are disabled and non-disabled children present in the same classrooms or
schools, non-disabled children may derivatively benefit from the rights of
disabled children because of IDEAs "least restrictive environment" require-
ment. But non-disabled students do not have standing and are not provided with
a right of action, express or implied, under IDEA or the Improving America's
Schools Act to claim a right to a minimally adequate education.145
If there is a disparity in derivative benefit accorded non-disabled children
fortunate enough to be in classrooms with disabled children versus those not
in classrooms with disabled children, there is no legal recourse for the latter
under IDEA. Because non-disabled children are not conferred a right to
education under IDEA or the Improving America's Schools Act, the only claim
these children may have is a constitutional equal protection claim. 46 It is
highly unlikely, however, that such a claim would prove successful. 47
In considering the potential for disparities, however, one should note the
significant number of disabled children in public schools. No data exist on the
percentage of schools, much less classrooms, with disabled children present,
but it is known that one in eight children is currently identified as disabled.148
It is also estimated that only sixty percent of all disabled children are currently
identified, 49 meaning that an estimated one in five children is or could be
identified as disabled. Because children often change classrooms throughout the
school day, it is unlikely to prove tenable from an efficiency or political
standpoint for a district to provide a minimally adequate education only in
those classrooms at those times when a disabled child is present.
144. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1994); 20 U.S.C. § 8901(b) (Supp. 1996).
145. See supra note 140; accord Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77,
94 (1981) ("[Unless ... congressional intent can be inferred from the language of the statute, the
statutory structure, or some other source, the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy
simply does not exist."); see also Pauline E. Calande, Note, State Incorporation of Federal Law: A
Response to the Demise of Implied Federal Rights ofAction, 94 YALE L.J. 1144, 1144-46 (1985) (noting
Court's increasing hostility towards implied federal rights of action and tendency to construe
congressional silence as evidence of intentional denial of private right of action).
146. In dicta, the Supreme Court noted that a total or absolute deprivation of education might
constitute an equal protection violation. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
36 (1973). Subsequent cases have been mixed in their conclusion. Compare Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1981) (holding that state cannot absolutely deprive alien children of an education) with Kadrmas
v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988) (holding that education is not a fundamental
right).
147. The Rodriguez Court held education not to be a fundamental right, see Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
at 13, and applied a rational basis test to state sanctioned disparities in programming, see id. at 36. It
seems likely that courts would countenance disparate treatment among non-disabled children where such
treatment resulted from a state's participation in the federal IDEA program as meeting the rational basis
test.
148. See DIGESr OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 65.
149. Cf. John Hogan, Playing Past Learning Disabilities, 275 SCI. AM., Nov. 1996, at 98, 102.
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The claim that the rights of disabled children are violated through failure
to provide disabled and non-disabled children a minimally adequate education
in the regular classroom has unique potential to unify the education communi-
ty.15 For once, IDEA litigation might be welcomed by teachers, parents,
civil rights advocates, and even local school administrators desperately seeking
school improvement in failing districts."' Local districts and teachers might
view an IDEA-based claim as offering the possibility of obtaining increased
support from the state, because ultimately states and not districts are held liable
for IDEA violations.'52 Parents, civil rights advocates, and other stakeholders
might share the same view or simply welcome pressure for a reallocation of
existing resources to achieve the ultimate goal of local school improvement.
Even states liable for such claims might welcome legal action as providing
political cover for asserting greater control over failing local districts.153
Thus, all members of the education community would have an interest in
identifying disabled children and welcoming them into the regular classroom,
since their presence might heighten the possibility of school reform and
improvement.
B. A Suggested Remedy: Opportunity-to-Learn Standards
IDEA does not require disabled children reach a particular level of
achievement.'5" It merely requires that a free appropriate public education be
provided in the least restrictive environment. School districts failing to meet
Improving America's Schools Act state-defined adequacy outcomes therefore
only presumptively fail to meet IDEAs mandate. The presumption may be
rebutted if a state can prove it is providing the conditions of teaching and
learning necessary for children to have a fair opportunity to achieve state-
defined academic and student performance standards. 55
150. In the past the education community has achieved much success by unifying around a specific
cause. See DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, CAME THE REVOLUTION 48 (1988) (noting success of the education
community in forming a coalition of public and private school advocates around the Title I program for
disadvantaged children).
151. Even business leaders concerned about the quality of their workforce and parents and school
personnel located in healthy districts concerned about a broader, more invasive statewide school finance
or desegregation should welcome such action. A remedy need not result in heightened school costs or
interdistrict reallocation of resources. See infra Section 1V.B.
152. See Gadsby v. Grasmick, No. 96-1292, 1997 WL 128548, at *13 (4th Cir. Mar. 21, 1997).
153. See supra note 42, at 23.
154. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.350 (1997) ("The Act does not require that any agency, teacher or other
person be held accountable if a child does not achieve the growth projected in the [IEP] annual goals
and objectives.")
155. The Goals 2000: Educate America Act identifies several broad areas that opportunity-to-learn
standards might address, including the quality and availability of curricula and instructional materials,
the capability of teachers to provide instruction in challenging subject matter, the safety of the learning
environment, and access to relevant facilities like libraries and laboratories. See 20 U.S.C. § 5843(c)
(Supp. 1996).
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This concept of defining the necessary conditions of teaching and learning,
known in the education policy community as opportunity-to-learn standards,
emerged during debate surrounding the Goals 2000: Educate America Act and
Improving America's Schools Act. 56 There was deep concern among a
number of Members of Congress with the unfairness of expecting children to
learn challenging content when placed in settings where it would be unreason-
able to expect a child to master such subject matter. '57 For example, it would
be unreasonable to expect a child to master concepts of chemistry when over
the course of the school year, she and her class of forty have twenty textbooks,
no laboratory, and face a series of different teachers, none of whom has a
degree in a science area.
The Goals 2000: Educate America Act required states to define opportuni-
ty-to-learn standards just as they define academic and performance stan-
dards. 5 ' Although the mandate was later repealed,' 59 the concept of oppor-
tunity-to-learn standards remains a trenchant and applicable tool for reviewing
state compliance with IDEA. Courts could review whether the conditions of
teaching and learning in a given state are reasonably related to providing
children a fair chance at meeting a state's content and performance stan-
dards."6° If there is or at least could conceivably be a reasonable relation, and
by a preponderance of the evidence a state proves it is providing a fair
opportunity-to-learn, it would meet its burden of proof under IDEA. If a state
is not providing a fair opportunity-to-leam, courts may "simply order state
officials to supply the services that [the state identifies as] enabling children to
satisfy its state performance standards. "161 And, if a state fails to offer
opportunity-to-learn standards that at least theoretically could be reasonably
related to academic standards and student performance standards, courts could
order the state to develop reasonable opportunity-to-learn standards and meet
them. Again, a state would not be held liable for student failure regardless of
circumstance. It would only be required to provide children in failing districts
with what is at least conceivably a fair chance at success.
156. See generally S. REP. No. 103-292 (1994); NATIONAL ISSUES: ESEA, supra note 48.
157. See generally NATIONAL ISSUES: ESEA, supra note 48; RAvrrCH, supra note 53.
158. See 20 U.S.C. § 5886(d) (Supp. 1996).
159. Regardless of congressional action, several states have nonetheless undertaken to define
opportunity-to-learn standards. See Finance Hearings, supra note 93, at 126 (1993) (testimony of Doug
Chiapetta)
160. A reasonability test is perhaps the only feasible form of judicial oversight. See San Antonio
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973) (noting that "complexity of the problems of financing
and managing a statewide public school system" counsels that "within the limits of rationality, the
legislature's efforts to tackle [education policy] problems should be entitled to respect") (internal
quotation and citation omitted).
161. See Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 330 (1991).
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This suggested opportunity-to-learn remedial scheme is perhaps as judicially
restrained a remedy as possible. States and not courts define academic,
performance, and opportunity-to-learn standards. Local districts still fully
control pedagogy and policy. The courts do not invalidate an entire state's
school finance system or intrude on the actions of non-failing, healthy school
districts. The courts do not even necessarily have to order more education
funding. 62 The courts simply do what they do most frequently in public
litigation cases: consider whether a policy is reasonably related to a goal and
evaluate whether that policy is in fact being carried out.
The suggested opportunity-to-learn remedy is also well-suited to overcom-
ing implementation obstacles at the political level. To avoid potential legal
action, state policymakers may consider withdrawing from the voluntary IDEA
and Improving America's Schools Act programs. But few, if any, should be
expected to do so. Non-failing districts receive substantial funding under both
programs, which provide nearly eighty percent of all federal aid to elementary
and secondary education,'63 and would likely strenuously object. States might
also consider lessening the rigor of their content and student performance
standards in an attempt to lower the number of failing districts and schools and
thereby reduce their legal liability."6 Such a move would, however, be self-
defeating. No study suggests that heightened standards increase failure."6 In
fact, education policy research indicates lower standards might actually increase
failure."6 Students who go unchallenged become bored, feel they are not
respected, and consequently fail in greater proportions than like students
challenged with rigorous subject matter. 67 A lowering of standards, there-
fore, may actually increase a state's liability under the suggested claim.
Finally, in responding to the suggested claim, states might attempt to revisit an
old and ongoing debate about the correlation between public resources and
student achievement. 68 But even the most ardent proponents of the notion
that increased resources do not correlate to increased student achievement
162. See CONSOLIDATED PLAN OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, (Trenton, NJ 1996). Chairman of
the Second National Education Summit and IBM Chief Executive Officer Louis Gerstner contends that
"we should be able [to teach students to high standards] out of the money we spend today." See Thomas
Toch et al., The Case for Tough Standards, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 1, 1996, at 52.
Nationally, the United States spends in excess of $270 billion annually on elementary and secondary
education. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 40 (1993).
163. See Fiscal Year 1997 Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208 (1996).
164. Approximately seventy-five percent of the American public support efforts to raise academic
standards. See Toch, supra note 162, at 53.
165. See MATHEWS, supra note 59, at 6.
166. Cf. NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF CHAPTER 1, supra note 95, at 13.
167. See supra Section lI.A.
168. See Finance Hearings, supra note 93, at 12-33 (testimony of Eric A. Hanushek & Ronald F.
Ferguson).
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concede that failure to provide a bare floor of opportunity has deleterious
effects on achievement. 69
The suggested claim and remedy also appear well-suited to overcoming
natural bureaucratic recalcitrance. In his work on public tort remedies, Suing
Government, Professor Peter Schuck notes four general sources of administra-
tive failure to comply with court-ordered injunctive relief. He identifies them
as failures of comprehension, capacity, motivation, and care. 70 The suggest-
ed remedy based on opportunity-to-learn standards should overcome each
barrier. Comprehension of the opportunity-to-learn standard concept ought to
be high, since the issue has been debated at the federal level and because
several states have already developed or are in the process of developing
opportunity-to-learn standards. 17' As for capacity, a strong body of educa-
tional research currently exists on effective practices for fostering student
achievement in high-need districts without an infusion of additional resourc-
es. 72 The unique nature and scope of this legal claim-utilizing IDEA to spur
education reform and improvement for disabled and non-disabled chil-
dren-should motivate administrators to see an opportunity-to-learn remedy as
an occasion for dramatic school reform, as opposed to nettlesome procedural
compliance for purposes of marginal importance. If the scope of the claim and
remedy is not motivation enough, the prospect of avoiding a far more intrusive
statewide school finance equalization court order pursuant to a state constitu-
tional challenge should encourage action. Lastly, even the most hardened
bureaucrat can be expected to care about the conditions of the suggested
claimant class of children, who would not be defined by racial, social, or
economic status.'7 If administrators do not show the requisite attention,
political leaders can be sure to hold their feet to the fire since education ranks
high among the issues important to citizens entering the voting booth. '"4
169. See RAVITCH, supra note 53, at 13-14. ("Even critics of opportunity-to-learn standards agree
that schools must meet fundamental standards of safety, healthfulness, and physical comfort ....
[S]tudents cannot be expected to learn or excel unless they have well-educated teachers, a sound
curriculum, appropriate instructional materials, and a well-maintained environment for learning.").
170. PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 3-13 (1983).
171. See supra note 159.
172. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., IMPLEMENTING SCHOOLWIDE PROJECTS: AN IDEA BOOK
FOR EDUCATORS, (Washington, DC 1993), see also Gershon Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban
Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEx. L. REV. 777, 801 (1985) (noting several
key characteristics of successful urban schools, none of which require increased spending).
173. A class limited to elementary school age children might cast an even more sympathetic hue.
Fifty percent of disabled children in this age group are already mainstreamed in regular classrooms. See
U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., To ASSURE THE FREE APPROPRIATE EDUCATION OF ALL CHILDREN WITH
DISABILITIES: SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 12 (1995). Additionally, elementary school age
children generally require less per pupil spending than secondary school age students. See DIGEST OF
EDUCATION STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 198.
174. See DICK MORRIS, BEHIND THE OVAL OFFICE: WINNING THE PRESIDENCY IN THE NINETIES
345 (1997) ("[E]ducation is America's number-one issue now.")
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V. CONCLUSION
The emergence of the standards-based reform movement requires a new
interpretation of IDEA's guarantee of a "free appropriate public education" in
the "least restrictive environment." In states that have adopted academic
standards that identify what children should know and be able to do, either
pursuant to state supreme court dictates or pursuant to the Improving America's
Schools Act, those standards are incorporated into IDEA's definition of a "free
appropriate public education." Because IDEA also requires that disabled
children be provided access to an adequate education in the "least restrictive
environment," a standards-based education must be provided to disabled
children in the regular classroom. Where disabled children are not receiving
an appropriate education in the regular classroom because of its general
inadequacy, IDEAs "least restrictive environment" requirement mandates that
the entire regular classroom program for all children be improved. Otherwise,
disabled students would have to be unilaterally segregated either outside or
within the regular classroom, both of which are contrary to the provisions of
the Act. Thus, pursuant to IDEA, when there are disabled children present, an
education based on state-defined academic standards must be provided in the
regular classroom to all children.
A school's or district's failure to meet minimum education adequacy
outcomes linked to state-defined academic standards establishes a prima facie
case that the state is not satisfying IDEA's mandate. If a disabled child files a
claim under IDEA, courts have at their disposal a hands-off, judicially
restrained remedy in the opportunity-to-learn standard concept. States need
only prove that they are providing the conditions of teaching and learning
necessary for children to have a fair opportunity to achieve state-defined
academic and student performance standards to be in compliance with IDEA.
States define expected student outcomes and the conditions of teaching and
learning necessary for children to have a fair chance at meeting those
outcomes. Courts merely review states' identification of those minimally
required conditions. States still determine minimum education expectations and
local officials still control pedagogy.
As to some of the more provocative elementary and secondary education
public policy debates ranging from private school choice to school desegrega-
tion, this note is agnostic. It does not argue for the desegregation sought
through Brown75 or school finance equalization pursued in Rodriguez.17 6
It instead merely seeks to reaffirm existing law by prompting states to meet
their promise of providing children with disabilities a fair chance to succeed.
175. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
176. San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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